

Post-Conflict Peace Building and Reconstruction in Nigeria's Northeast: An Appraisal

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Abstract

Peace is no doubt sine-quo-non to peaceful co-existence and development of society while insurgencies and wars are antithetical to development of mankind. This paper attempts an appraisal of post-conflict peace building and reconstruction in Nigeria's North-east. The paper used descriptive method and secondary sources of data. It observed that Boko Haram insurgence wreaked a lot of havoc on the states of Northeast region ranging from the destruction of property, kidnapping, loss of human lives, desertion of towns and villages, and dislocation of families, which led to the consequent establishment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) camps to take care of the survivors. The paper averred that the initial government response to Boko Haram insurgence was the use of force but when the attacks of the insurgents on the Northeast region became more pronounced and deadly as a result of change in strategies and tactics, with the use of improvised weapons, the government realised that it could not unilaterally deal with the situation without calling for the support of stakeholders, especially the international community with emphasis on western powers and neighbouring countries. With a view to ensuring the success of post-conflict peace building among the affected people and reconstruction of the shattered environment, the government setup committees and agencies such as National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), Presidential Committee on the Northeast Initiative (PCNI), Presidential Initiative on the North-East (PINE), among others to assist the survivors, especially the most vulnerable - the women and children in the rehabilitation process. The paper concludes that in order to achieve government goals on peace building and reconstruction, there should be effective monitoring of the programmes while the process of implementation should be more open, transparent and accountable.

Key words: Nigeria's North-east, Peace building, Post-conflict peace building, Post-conflict reconstruction

Introduction

Conflict is generally regarded as a clash of interest which may be personal, racial, class, caste, political, social, economic, religious, regional and international. According to Afzalur (2001), conflict manifests in incompatibility, disagreement or dissonance within or

between social entities. Any untoward attitude capable of charging up the political or social environment is likely to culminate in conflict. Greed, covetousness, self-centeredness, discontent, envy, arrogance, rudeness, impunity among others are capable of producing a breakdown of human relations. In a way, these vices are innate attributes of the ‘conflict nature’ of man, which has become part of human life and society.

In contemporary era, conflict and violence are becoming increasingly unabated with many conflicts waged between the state and non-state actors such as political militias, criminal gangs, and international terrorist groups. Unresolved regional tensions, a breakdown in the rule of law, absence of state institutions, illicit economic gains, and the scarcity of resources exacerbated by climate change, have become dominant drivers of conflict. As it has been observed in the United Nations @75 bulletin: *A New Era of Conflict and Violence* (n/d), in 2016 alone, more countries experienced violent conflict than any point in almost 30 years. In 2017, almost half a million people across the world were killed in homicides, 89,000 killed in active armed conflicts and 19,000 were killed in terrorist attacks.

Conflict remains the primary driver of terrorism, with more than 99 per cent of all terrorist-related deaths occurring in countries involved in a violent conflict or with high levels of political terror. Worldwide today, majority of deadly attacks which took place in the Middle East, North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa, with Afghanistan, Iraq, Nigeria, Somalia, and Syria, carried heavy burden. For instance, in Afghanistan, more people were killed as a result of fighting than in any other current conflict in the world. Separate attacks by Taliban insurgents and Islamic State militants have rocked cities and towns across the country. In Iraq and Syria, the Islamic State (IS) took over parts of Anbar province and eventually expanded its control in the northern part of the country and captured Mosul in June 2014. The fight to dislodge the IS was exacerbated by underlying sectarian tensions in Iraq among Sunni and Shiite groups.

In Africa, different kinds of conflict are identified. For instance, there are protracted conflicts in East Africa, such as the war in South Sudan, the collapse of the State in Somalia, and the conflicts in Rwanda and Burundi, and intractable fratricidal war in South Sudan. Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Burkina Faso, Mali, Libya and Boko Haram crisis in Nigeria, Chad, Niger and Cameroon. In fact, the regularity of conflicts in Africa has become one of the distinct characteristics of the continent (Ajayi, cited in Aremu, 2010).

Nigeria’s Northeast since 2009 has been under state of unrest, violence and insecurity due to the Boko Haram’s insurgency. A decade on, the conflict is far from being over and people continue to lose their lives and properties, forced from their homes and many families displaced. The Boko Haram sectarian group, which is regarded as one of the world’s most notorious rebel groups still remains undefeated. The earlier response to this emergent insurgency by the government was the adoption of a military approach to the management of the internal disorder. This coercive strategy is congruent with the ideology of the US-led “War on Terror” (Aghedo & Osumah, 2014, p.206). The failure of this counter-insurgency strategy has brought into limelight different collaborative efforts between the government’s

security agencies and civilians, inter-governmental collaborations, as well as between the government and non-governmental organizations.

Recently, the Northeast Nigeria faces significant challenges in its recovery from the war against terrorism of Boko Haram. In the words of Amalu (2015, p.35),

The spate of violent attacks by Boko Haram in recent times has claimed a lot of lives and property; compounded the food and nutrition insecurity situation; aided the spread of infectious diseases; denied millions of children and youths access to education; increased the number of internally displaced persons with dire need of shelter and has caused people to live in constant fear and anxiety.

Though the spate of Boko Haram's violent attacks has been characterised by the abduction and killing of people; destruction of houses, schools, health care centres, churches, mosques and farms (Amalu, 2015), the Presidency has insisted that the group has been technically defeated. In the light of this realisation, the government is of the perception that post-conflict peace building and reconstruction is required in Nigeria's Northeast. To restore peace and reconstruct the economy of the region, various initiatives have been formulated and implemented. These efforts include the Presidential Initiative for the North-East (PINE), National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), Presidential Committee on the North-East Initiative (PCNI), Victims Support Fund (VSF), Safe Schools Initiative (SSI), Special Committee on the Resettlement and Rehabilitation of the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), the various states development strategies, and the foreign intervention development strategies.

Against the foregoing background, this paper appraises post-conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction in Northeast Nigeria. In order to accomplish the task of this paper, the paper is divided into six segments. The first segment focuses attention on conceptualisation and theoretical framework, the second segment addresses the geo-political structure of the Northeast and the third reveals the evolution and development of Boko Haram insurgency. The fourth segment treats government's response to Boko Haram insurgency. The fifth segment attempts an evaluation of post-conflict peace building and reconstruction efforts in Nigeria's Northeast while the last segment discusses the conclusion and recommendations.

Conceptual Clarification

Post-Conflict Peace Building

The term post-conflict peace building consists of two notions namely 'post-conflict' and 'peace building'. It is, therefore, imperative to explain peace building first to facilitate our understanding of post-conflict peace building. Peace building is a difficult concept to define while it is more challenging to attain its ultimate objective. Peace building is conceived as a complex, long-term process of creating the necessary conditions for sustainable peace. It works by addressing the deep-rooted, structural causes of violent conflict in a comprehensive manner (George, 2019). It is thus a multi-dimensional undertaking that involves a multitude of actors. Each organisation approaches the field of peace building in a different manner (Amsami, 2019).

Practitioners of peacebuilding are of the perception that the term “peacebuilding” emerged from UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s 1992 report *an Agenda for Peace*. However, Boutros-Ghali was not the first to introduce the term “peacebuilding” to the international community. In fact, Johan Galtung, was said to be introduced the term “peacebuilding” in 1976 (George, 2019). Galtung developed his concept of peacebuilding through his early writings on peace, negative and positive peace, and direct and indirect (structural) violence (George, 2019).

In 2008, after much deliberation about creating a UN doctrine for peacekeeping, DPKO published its first doctrinal publication, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*. Also known as the *Capstone Doctrine*, this publication provided a good definition of peacebuilding.

Peacebuilding is perceived as a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capabilities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development (Amsami, 2019). Peacebuilding requires multiple strategies and concerted effort in order to achieve sustainable peace, which can guarantee confidence, trust and harmonious co-existence between the warring parties (Umar, Mohammed & Uddin, 2019).

Post-conflict peacebuilding is a term introduced by the then United Nations Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali in his report, *An Agenda for Peace* in 1992. The first edition of *an Agenda for Peace* outlined all three of Galtung’s approaches to peace — peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peacebuilding. Boutros-Ghali, however, called it “post-conflict peacebuilding” (George, 2019). The report defined post-conflict peacebuilding as an “action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict”. Bennett, Kim, O’Donnell and Sitea (2007) categorised post-conflict peacebuilding into three dimensions: stabilising the post-conflict zone, restoring state institutions, and dealing with social and economic issues.

The 2009 UN Secretary General’s Report on Peacebuilding set out five priority areas for interventions in post-conflict contexts: establishing security, building confidence in a political process, delivering initial peace dividends, and expanding core national capacity (United Nations, 2009).

For this study, post-conflict peace building focuses on helping nation, state or society recover from violent conflicts, whether internal wars or wars between states. Recovery from violent conflict is a long-term process, and it requires the expenditure of vast amount of resources, while wide range of professionals and actors are equally required. Hence, peace building has since been expanded to include many different dimensions and phases such as disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration and rebuilding governmental, economic and civil society institutions.

Post-Conflict Reconstruction

The term post-conflict is often loosely defined (Dodge, 2006) and used casually in many completely different state contexts and political conditions. The various approaches to post-conflict reconstruction usually address specific post-conflict conditions by focusing on the reconstruction efforts of government, international agencies and non-governmental

organisations. This is always consequent upon violent conflicts as in the case of Europe(Marshall Plan) and Japan after the Second World War and that of the reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina in contemporary era. There has however, been the need for reconstruction amidst ongoing conflict in recent time, as in the case of Iraq, Afghanistan, and in more recent instance of Gaza. In all the instances cited, the conflict persists at fluctuating intensities.

Post-conflict reconstruction is thus conceived as a step, aimed at rebuilding the basic physical infrastructure destroyed and shelter demolished or burnt down during crises in order to enable people to begin afresh. It is a strategy which involves reinstating lost livelihoods, introducing new economic opportunities and improving land and water management processes so as to reduce people's vulnerability and enhance capacities to handle future calamities (Nathaniel, 2014 cited in Muddassir & Sanusi, 2019).Snodderly (2011) described reconstruction as the process of rebuilding degraded, damaged or destroyed political, socio-economic, and physical infrastructure of a country or territory, disarmament and reintegration of combatants, resettling internally displaced persons, reforming governmental institutions, promoting trauma counselling and reconciliation, delivering justice, and restarting the economy in order to create a solid the foundation for a long-term development.

According to the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO)(cited in Muddassir& Sanusi, 2019), reconstruction and economic recovery refer to measures that help to restore the livelihoods, assets and production levels of devastated communities. These measures rebuild essential infrastructure, institutions and services; and restore the means of production destroyed or made non-operational by a disaster. Economic recovery and reconstruction assistance are thus geared towards limiting the need for relief and allowing substantial development activities to evolve.

For the purpose of this paper, post conflict reconstruction therefore involves an attempt to rebuild and reform the north-eastern Nigeria politically, economically, and socially consequent upon the unquantifiable damages and destruction caused by Boko Haram insurgency.

Theoretical Framework

Structural theory of conflict is adopted to explain the focus of this paper. The structural theory attempts to explain conflict as a product of the tension that arises when groups compete for scarce recourses. The central argument of this theory is that conflict is built into the particular ways which societies are structured or organized. It perceives the competition for resources that are usually scarce, which is accentuated by the incompatible interest of individuals and groups as the cause of social conflict (Collier, cited in Faleti, 2012). It describes the conditions of the society and how such conditions or environment create conflict. Structural conflict theory identifies such conditions as social exclusion, deprivation, class inequalities, injustice, political marginalization, gender imbalances, racial segregation, economic exploitation and the likes, all of which often lead to conflict (Oakland, 2005).

The theory is divided into two orientations. The first is the radical structural theory, which is represented by the Marxist dialectical school and championed by Karl Marx,

Fiedrich Engels, V. I. Lenin and Mao Tse Tung while the other, the liberal structuralism, has Ross (1993) and Scarborough (1998) as its protagonists. This school was however, popularized by the famous work of Johan Galtung (1990) on structural violence.

Marxian dialectical materialism perceives conflict as the product of economic structures and institutions. For them, it is the capitalist orientation, which is exploitative in nature based on its relations of production and the division of the society into the proletariat and the bourgeoisie within the political system that creates conflict. While Marxian approach is of the view that the structural defects could only be transformed by revolution, liberal structuralism canvasses for the elimination of defects through policy reforms.

Structural theorists maintain that conflict occurs because of the exploitative and unjust nature of human societies or because of domination of one class by another. The theory is however, deficient in its one-sidedness of looking at causes of conflict. It, for instance, does not see the bright sides of racial or ethnic diversity and the strength that a society may derive from pluralism. It only sees the flaws. The structural theory thus makes sense only when conflicts are viewed from the broadest possible perspective, and only if the observer opts to ignore alternate causes of the conflict.

However, the theory is relevant to explaining what is responsible for post-conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction issues in the Northeast Nigeria which is primarily the insurgencies of the Boko Haram. Peace is therefore, an essential prerequisite because without peace, it will not be possible to achieve the level of cooperation, trust and inclusiveness necessary to solve the insurgency challenges and empower the relevant institutions and agencies in the fight against the insurgence in the Northeast Nigeria. In post-conflict Northeastern region, peacebuilding offers itself as an important option for rehabilitation, integration and economic recovery and reconstruction in order to make life more abundant for the internally displaced persons.

The Geo-Political Structure of the Northeast Nigeria

Northeast is one of the political components that make up the six geo-political zones that make-up Nigeria. The geo-political zone consists of Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba and Yobe states (Amsami, 2019). The zone covers close to one-third (280,419km²) of Nigeria's land area (909,890km²). According to the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) projections for 2011, these States have 13.5% (i.e. 23,558,674) of Nigeria's population which is put at 173,905,439 (Ibrahim, 2012).

The inhabitants of the region are mainly Fulani and Kanuri people with more than one hundred (100) minority ethnic groups. Northeast zone of Nigeria lies between the vast arid expanse of the Sahara and the dense tropical rain forest along the Guinea Coast. Delimiting the area is Cameroon on the east, Niger and Chad republics on the north, North-Central Nigeria on the west, and South-Eastern Nigeria on the south. This area shares various geographical, economic, social and political features (Amsami, 2019).

In a study conducted by Dodo (2012), the northern states of Nigeria accounted for the large population of the citizens living in poverty. On a geo-political zone, the Northwest has 77.7% of its population living in relative poverty, Northeast came second with 76.3%, and the North-central states has 67.5%. The combination of primary drivers of conflict in northeast

Nigeria, with the dynamics of the conflict since 2009 and pre-existing structural constraints explains the nature, magnitude and severity of the disruptions and losses caused to livelihoods, economic productivity, exposure to disease and social cohesion (UNDP, 2017).

The evolution and the development of Boko Haram Insurgence in Nigeria

The most devastating armed conflict that has taken place in Nigeria's northeast in contemporary period is the Boko Haram insurgency. The Boko Haram sect, which was founded in 2002 is formally known as *Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awatiwal-Jihad* literally meaning people committed to the propagation of the Prophet's teachings and the Jihad. The sect was once called Yusuffiya Movement, after its founder, Mohammed Yusuf. When it started, it drew membership "largely of hundreds of impoverished northern Islamic students and clerics as well as university students and professionals, many of whom are unemployed" (Adibe, 2012, p. 51).

Boko Haram is an Islamist sect turned armed movement. The group first emerged as an Islamic reform movement in the northeastern town of Maiduguri in the early 2000s. Its members followed the charismatic Salafi preacher Muhammad Yusuf, who condemned Western-style education and corrupt secular governance while also cultivating strategic ties to the city's elites (Brechenmacher, 2019).

Brechenmacher (2019) divided the subsequent evolution of the conflict into three main phases, namely; emergence of guerilla warfare and an ineffective initial response (2010-2012), expanding territorial control and military setbacks (2013-2014), and regionalization and return to clandestine tactics (2015-present). As Amsami (2019) noted, the Boko Haram insurgents in 2003 set its base in Kanama on the Niger border. They attacked police stations and then fled from the Army toward the Mandara Mountains in Cameroon. By 2004, under the leadership of a radical preacher, Mohammed Yusuf, an extremist core of a sect was formed that came to be recognised as Boko Haram, that is, Western education is sacrilege.

In 2009, clashes between Boko Haram members and police forces escalated into several days of armed uprising in Maiduguri. Following this encounter with the police, Mohammed Yusuf called for Jihad and was summarily executed by the police. The Army intervened and the crackdown left thousands of people dead in Maiduguri, mostly civilians (International Crisis Group, 2014). Following Yusuf's death, Boko Haram supporters went into hiding until the movement's re-emergence in 2010 when Abubakar Shekau, Yusuf's deputy, became the group's leader. Under Shekau's leadership, the movement regrouped in Maiduguri, the capital of Borno State, and launched revenge attacks on police and security forces afterwards (Karlsson 2016).

The Boko Haram insurgency, which initially started in Maiduguri, later snowballed to other cities such as Damaturu, Potiskum and Bauchi all in the northeast. Under its new leader, Abubakar Shekau, the group which had gone underground was later resuscitated inflicting fatal attacks and deadly strikes in Bauchi in 2010, Abuja in 2011, Kano in 2012, and Zaria in 2014. Today, Boko Haram has become one of the terrorist groups in the world with external links with Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabaab, Hezbollah, Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in Mali, Libya, and Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) (Je'Adayibe, 2016). The immediate causes and

objective of the group is still somehow shrouded in mystery despite many disclosures (Amsami, 2019).

However, extra-judicial killing, poverty, neglect, pauperisation of the youth, corruption, ethnicity and religious ideology are identified as causes of the conflict. According to Linden (2014, p.4),

Yusuf's extra-judicial murder at a police station in 2009 led to the rise of Abubakar Shekau as the leader of what became known widely as Boko Haram. The poverty and neglect of the north-eastern states; the indigence and pauperization of its youth; and the corruption of political elites were the tinderbox. Religious ideology was the spark.

Boko Haram has also wreaked severe havoc through bombings and other terrorist activities that have left hundreds of people dead and property destroyed, and perpetrated fear and agony among its victims. *Boko Haram* is estimated to have killed more than 20,000 persons but the unofficial number is much higher (Shettima, 2017). In the view of Ofongo (2016), the emergence of the *Boko Haram* Sect in Nigeria has not only affected the strategic calculation of internal security in the country but has also completely altered the shape of the geostrategic security relations with neighboring countries (p. 147).

Government's Response to Boko Haram Insurgence

Since 2009 when the Nigerian government realised that the activities of the *Boko Haram* have constituted a major security threat to the nation and made the northeast most vulnerable region of the country to live, the management of the conflict has moved between the use of extreme force, appeasement, amnesty, and negotiation (Akubo & Okolo, 2019; Fawole, 2013). Members of the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) were the first to be deployed. However, the deadly nature of the conflict necessitated the deployment of men of the Nigerian Army. The military has been the dominant actor through the command of *Operation Lafiya Dole*, *Operation Deep Punch I and II* and *Ruwan Wuta* operations (Omar & Ndubishi, 2018).

Since 2010, the coalition fighting the *Boko Haram* insurgency in Nigeria Northeast has broadened in composition to include vigilantes known as the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), the Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF) (comprising troops from Nigeria, Niger Republic, Chad, and Cameroon), and Nigeria's Joint Task Force (JTF). Yakohene (2015) argued that the establishment of a special Joint Task Force codenamed 'Operation Restore Order' (JTF ORO) established to eliminate the threat posed by *Boko Haram* recorded somewhat modest successes. However, the efforts to arrest, detain, and even kill *Boko Haram* militants implemented by this broad coalition have been largely counterproductive (Aghedo & Osumah, 2014).

It is pertinent to note that in order to strengthen and give legal backing to government's attack on *Boko Haram*, Terrorism (Prevention) Act (TPA) was enacted by the National Assembly in May 2011 and was signed into law by President Goodluck Jonathan in June 2011. The Act was modeled on international standards, including United Nations guidelines. It addressed the issues of prevention, prohibition, and combating terrorism and

financing in Nigeria (Bhura, 2012). In lieu of expanding the role of the Office of the National Security Advisor (ONSA) as the main coordinator for all counterterrorism enforcement activity, the Act was amended in 2013.

In December 2011, following spates of Boko Haram attacks, President Jonathan declared a state of emergency in fifteen (15) local government areas of four northern states (Borno, Niger, Yobe and Plateau) where the terror activities of the group were so pronounced. In April 2013, the Jonathan's Administration established a Presidential Committee on Dialogue and Peaceful Resolution of Security Challenges in the North. The Committee, which was headed by the Special Duties Minister Kabiru Turaki was required to establish talks with the leadership of Boko Haram with a view to granting amnesty to willing members.

Furthermore, Jonathan's Administration sacked his Defence Minister, Dr Bello Haliru Mohammed and National Security Adviser (NSA), General Owoye Andrew Azazi. Azazi was replaced by Colonel Sambo Dasuki (rtd), a former Aide-De-Camp to ex-Military President Ibrahim Babangida, while Dr Bello Haliru was replaced by Kabiru Tanimu Turaki in June 2012. When the activities of Boko Haram became deadlier, President Goodluck Jonathan in May, 2013 declared a state of emergency in three northern states namely Borno, Adamawa and Yobe, where Boko Haram had been terribly active. This is in an attempt to restore order and reclaim control of the territories occupied by the sect (BBC News, 2013). Following this decision, Jonathan vowed to "take all necessary action...to put an end to the impunity of insurgents and terrorists" including the arrest and detention of suspects, the taking over of Boko Haram hideouts, the lockdown of suspected Boko Haram enclaves, the conducting of raids, and the arrest of anyone possessing illegal weapons (Integrated Regional Information Networks, 22 May 2013).

When President Muhammadu Buhari took over the mantle of leadership of the country, he reiterated in his inaugural speech, his commitment to end Boko Haram insurgency. Through assistance from armies from neighbouring countries - Chad, Cameroon and Niger, it was obvious that Boko Haram was pushed out of many towns they had occupied in the region. The President ordered the relocation of the military command centre to Maiduguri, Borno State, the epicentre of Boko Haram attacks and gave the military three months order to subdue the terrorists. Strategically, counter-insurgency operations against Boko Haram focused on destroying the camps and safe havens such as the notorious Sambisa Forest where Boko Haram stored weapons and kept captives.

With the technical and intelligence support and cooperation from the United States of America (USA), other Western nations and neighbouring countries, and international and regional organisations, several key and top Boko Haram commanders were killed or captured. By the end of 2015, the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) announced that there were no community that remained under the control of Boko Haram in North East region of Nigeria (NEMA, 2016). Consequently, few months after, President Muhammadu Buhari told the BBC News that Nigeria has technically won the war against Islamist Boko Haram militants. According to him, the militant group no longer mount conventional attacks against security forces or population but had reduced the attacks to fighting with improvised

explosives devices (IED) and remained a force only in the heartland of Borno state (BBC News, 24 December 2015).

However, between 2015 and now, the effectiveness of the military campaign improved and the Nigerian government managed to recapture territories from Boko Haram, pushing the group to more marginal areas (Akubo & Okolo, 2019). The clampdown on Boko Haram insurgents by the members of the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), the Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF) (comprising troops from Nigeria, Niger Republic, Chad, and Cameroon), and Nigeria's Joint Task Force (JTF) had continued.

President Buhari embarked on a closer and more defined relationship with his neighbors and brought Benin into the fold by meeting its leaders. He directed the relocation of the military command and control center from the capital Abuja to Maiduguri – the main city at the heart of the insurgency, until the conflict is resolved (Yakohene 2015, p. 55). Huge sums of monies are frequently allocated to the security sector annually from the national budgets as well as budgetary allocations of the northeastern states affected by the insurgency. Olufemi (2015) reported that a total of ₦4.62 trillion has been allocated to the federal security sector alone between 2011 and 2015.

Procurement of military equipment is another way in which the government has responded to the insurgency. During the Goodluck Jonathan administration, over \$15 billion was awarded for arms procurement. The European Union and other Western allies have also been supportive of the country's counterinsurgency measures particularly in the financial and humanitarian aids to the conflict-prone states and internally displaced persons' camps in the northern region. The federal government also resorted to ransom payment and prisoner swap to secure the release of 103 abducted Chibok School-girls in 2017 and 104 Dapchi School-girls in 2018. In recent time, more military equipment is being acquired to strengthen the military personnel efforts in decisively dealing with the Boko Haram crises.

An Appraisal of Post-Conflict Peace Building and Reconstruction Efforts in Nigeria's Northeast

The post-conflict peace building initiative in northeast Nigeria began in 2013 with the establishment of a 26-member Presidential Committee on Dialogue and Peaceful Resolution of Security Challenges in the North. The committee was set up and inaugurated in 24 April 2013 to open talks with the Boko Haram within three months and work out modalities for an amnesty for the insurgents and compensation for its victims. Its chairman was Malam Kabiru Turaki, a minister of Special Duties in the Office of the President with other government officials, religious authorities and human rights activists as members.

The Committee was given a three-month mandate to convince Boko Haram to lay down its arms in exchange for a state pardon and reintegration (Thurston, 2013). According to Campbell (2013), "even if the prospects for success are low, as defined by the modalities, the Committee is an important step forward and a first step toward addressing the insurgency in the North by political means...". After an extension by 2 months of its initial 90 days task, the Turaki-led Committee submitted its recommendations. Among its recommendations were that security agencies require urgent improvement in conditions of service, training and up-to-date equipment to face the security challenges confronting the country (Wakili, 2013).

However, Abubakar Shekau's refusal to accept the amnesty deal, emphasizing that his group had not committed any wrong, and that an amnesty, therefore, would not be applicable to them. Shekau contended that it was rather the Nigerian government that has been committing atrocities against Muslims (Agbibo & Maiangwa, 2014).

In view of the failure of the initiative, the Jonathan-led government established a Countering Violent Extremism agency under the Office of National Security Adviser (ONSA), code-named "National Security Corridor" to counter recruitment and mobilization into Boko Haram and rehabilitate defectors. The agency was headed by a psychologist, Fatima Akilu. According to the program, defectors are classified into three categories: low-risk, medium-risk and high-risk defectors. For the first two categories, disengagement, rehabilitation, and reintegration methods were applied, while the high-risk defectors were meant for prosecution (Felbab-Brown, 2018). However, the impact of this program has not been felt prior to the emergence of General Muhammadu Buhari in 2015.

A deradicalization program known as Operation Safe Corridor (OPSC) was unveiled in 2015 at a Nigerian National Security Council meeting when the government offered former Boko Haram members a chance at rehabilitation and reintegration. The coordinator of this program was Brig. General Bamidele Mathew Shafa. The OPSC is designed as a multi-sector approach involving 13 key government agencies (including the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA), the Nigerian Prisons Service (NPS), Nigerian Police Force (NPF), Department of Security Services (DSS), Nigerian Immigration Service (NIS), National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), National Identity Management Commission (NIMC), Armed Forces, National Orientation Agency (NOA), National Youth Service Corps (NYSC), National Directorate of Employment (NDE), and the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC), to deradicalize, rehabilitate, and reintegrate defectors (Nwankpa, 2019).

Unlike the previous program, the defectors are now streamlined into two categories: "high-risk" and "low-risk defectors". While the high-risk defectors are to undergo prosecution, the low-risk defectors are exposed to rehabilitation and reintegration exercises (Felbab-Brown, 2018). The program principally targets "repentant insurgents" for a 52-week intensive exercise based on deradicalization therapies, vocational training, basic education, and religious re-education for reintegration into the society (Felbab-Brown, 2018; Nwankpa, 2019). While the adults undergo vocational training, the children are provided basic education. The rehabilitation exercises are supported with psycho-social therapies and religious programs. Upon completion of the exercise, the government hands over the women and children to their families or village heads and provides some money to cater for their new life (Felbab-Brown, 2018).

As of December 2018, it was reported that 254 ex-combatants have been reintegrated into the society. Of this number, 95 of them were released to their respective states including Adamawa, Yobe, and Borno. Three of them were from Chad Republic (Sahara Reporters, cited in Onapajo & Ozden, 2020). In August 2019, another 151 former Boko Haram fighters were handed over to the state government from the Bulumkutu Rehabilitation Centre in Maiduguri (ADF, 22 June 2020). In October 2019, a batch of 132 inmates of the

Bulumkutu Centre was released for reintegration having undergone 12 months of rehabilitation (The Nation, cited in Onapajo & Ozden, 2020). Records also show that 1803 people have thus far been released at various times between 2016 and 2017 at the female camp in Bulumkutu (Felbab-Brown, 2018).

However, as Onapajo and Ozden (2020) havenoted, the challenges of the deradicalization programinclude: First, societal perception of the reintegrated former combatants which they believed that communities still perceive them as dangerous individuals. Secondly, narrow focus on “repentant insurgents” as targets of deradicalization.Third, exclusion of these individuals in the deradicalization program which underscores a potential security risk that is overlooked by the government. There is, also lack of public trust as a result of many decades of corruption, profligacy, and outright neglect of people’s welfare. Moreover, there is weak structure and lack of a useful database for accurate information about people and their activities within the country. They argued further that the present deradicalization program only involves giving a stipend to the returning individuals which may not last them for a month. The reintegration is more problematic as the program does not have a clear agenda to economically engage the individuals.

Consequently, Nigeria’s military forces have been successful in the fight against the group, killing its members, destroying insurgent bases, disrupting their logistic networks, and freeing captives. The Nigeria’s Northeast has suffered destruction from virtually all indices of a developed society. Presently, the region’s level of advancement has been put several decades backward following massive destruction of their schools, churches, mosques, markets, restaurants, and other socio-economic infrastructure by Boko Haram insurgence (Muddassir & Sanusi, 2019). In addition to Operation Safe Corridor, the Federal Government also launched a de-radicalization program targeting wives of Boko Haram members. Most of these women were apprehended by the military during raid of camps where the insurgents were hiding (Kwaja, 2017).

Apart from the deradicalization, rehabilitation andreintegration of repentant terrorists, the Federal Government is also rebuilding parts of the Northeast that havebeen ravaged by insurgencies.The government established a lot of agencies and committees to respondto the crises and provide relief to the citizens of the Northeast. These include the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), Presidential Initiative on the North East (PINE), Presidential Committee on the North-East Initiative (PCNI), Victims Support Fund (VSF), Safe Schools Initiative (SSI), and Special Committee on the Resettlement and Rehabilitation of the IDPs. Also, the various State Governments of the affected areas have been making efforts on reconstruction cum economic recovery (Ibrahim &Ipinmoye, 2015). Five of these post-reconstruction efforts in Northeast Nigeria are thus examined in this paper.

1. The National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), an institution responsible for emergencies and disaster response.It is the Federal Government agency mandated to run and organize IDP camps. NEMA has been at the forefront of completing arrangements to hold repatriated Northeast refugees along with the IDPs who remained within the country. According to Muhammad Sani-Sidi, the Director General of NEMA, out of the 981,416 internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the country as at January 2015,107,997 IDPs were

living in established camps for IDPs while 804,732 live with the host communities and relations. It is pertinent to say that 66,087 of the IDPs were displaced by natural disasters while 915,329 were as a result of the insurgency in the North-east (Oluwole, Okechukwu & Aloh, 2017).

There are 18 formal IDP camps in Borno State, 7 in Yobe and 4 in Adamawa states respectively while there are 16 satellite camps in the liberated areas of Borno State. To address the humanitarian challenges in the Northeast, the Federal Government through NEMA established cells in Maiduguri and sub-cells in Yola, Adamawa State and Damaturu, Yobe State, in collaboration with the military. This was to create access for aid workers to provide the much-needed assistance to the IDPs and open a safe corridor for local people that escaped Boko Haram occupations and repentant militants to move into safety.

It is argued that NEMA had been providing relief services like: deploying ambulances at strategic locations to support and evacuate victims to hospitals and to provide first aid; providing comprehensive humanitarian support to 3,200 IDPs from Baga at its secure facility at Teachers Camp, Maiduguri; sewing of five (5) sets of new garments for women and children rescued from Sambisa Forest and registering and transporting 11,499 returnees from Niger Republic to their home states; setting up and maintaining feeding and sanitation centers in IDP Camps;

Others include partnering with bilateral and multilateral agencies, United States Government and others in providing relief to the IDPs; providing psychosocial support and counseling for 275 women and children rescued from Sambisa Forest by the Armed Forces; regularly presenting relief materials to refugees and supporting the provision of educational materials and schooling by the Kano State Government to Orphans and IDPs (Ibrahim & Ipinmoye, 2015, p. 187).

To complement the efforts of the affected state governments and also to cushion the humanitarian challenges especially on food security and nutrition, NEMA has been providing food items to the IDPs in the camps. To ensure the steady supply of these food and Non-Food items (NFIs), NEMA signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Borno and Yobe states. It equally entered into a mutual agreement with Adamawa state on provision of reliefs to IDPs (Eckson, 2016).

For instance, between February and July 2016, a total of 55,950 bags of rice, 30,214 bags of maize and other assorted food and non-food items were handed over to the Borno State Government by the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) for distribution to various IDP camps in Maiduguri. NEMA also supplied to the Borno State Government within the period with 10,400 bags of beans, 10,135 bags of sugar, 100 bags of millet, 1,200 bags of maize grits, 2,100 cartons of tomato paste, 2,100 cartons of Maggi cubes, 1,500 bags of salt, 180 bags of flour, 2,400 jerry cans of vegetable oil and 2,400 jerry cans of palm oil. These items were supplied in fulfillment of an existing MoU with the State Government.

Others were 850 pieces of mattresses, 1,140 cartons of macaroni noodles, 5,150 pieces of blankets, 900 pieces of mosquito nets, 1,358 bags of guinea corn, 100 bags of maize, 390 cartons of “Garindanwake”, 239 cartons of powdered milk, 1,600 pieces of guinea brocade, 2,115 Wax prints, 180 Cartons of toilet soap, 100 cartons of detergents, 200 pieces

of plastic cups, 350 pieces of plastic plates, 1,900 pieces of plastic buckets and 640 packets of zinc nails (NEMA, 2016).

In addition to the humanitarian intervention in Borno State, the agency has also been unwavering in its commitment to the provision of supports to IDPs in Yobe, Adamawa states and other locations across the country. A part of coordination role, the agency has been collaborating with other organisations in carrying out medical outreaches to the IDPs in the camps as well as providing medical consumables for camp clinics and referral hospital within Maiduguri (NEMA, 2016).

2. The Presidential Committee on the Northeast Initiative (PCNI) was inaugurated by President Muhammadu Buharion October 26, 2016 under the Chairmanship of Lt. Gen T.Y. Danjuma (Rtd). It is domiciled in the Presidency and is charged with responsibility for developing the strategy and implementation framework for rebuilding the North-East region. PCNI is funded through Federal, State and Local Government appropriation, as well as funds from the private sector and international development partners.

This program has been developed to comprehensively address the issues and gaps identified as all interventions as well as the Stakeholders contributing them require some platform from which to target, deploy and measure the impact of their humanitarian support to IDPs and Repatriated Refugees alike. A total of 97 IDP camps and camp-like sites were identified and assessed in across the country and the above were identified as located within the North East (IOM Nigeria Situation Report, 2016). It was indicated that there is an estimated 167,095 IDPs in these camps that may potentially be relocated to safer areas closer to their home communities (PCNI, 2016).

In February 2018, PCNI monitored the medical outreach conducted at Bayara General Hospital, Bauchi as a medical assistance given to the people. Similar exercise was carried out in other affected states of the Northeast. The medical intervention was supported by ProHealth International and other health Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) with a team of qualified doctors in various fields (Premium Times, 23 February 2018).

3. The Presidential Initiative on the North East (PINE) program was launched by President Jonathan's Representative, the Minister of Power Alhaji Mohammed Wakili on November 14, 2014. It aimed to deploy more troops and resources that will help to ensure that the occupied towns are recaptured. The PINE Economic reconstruction and redevelopment plan is an intervention plan designed to mobilize targeted resources to jumpstart the economies of the North-eastern states while strategically repositioning the region for long-term prosperity (Oluwole et al., 2017). According to the PINE (2015), its objectives include setting a policy direction for economic growth, enhance inter-governmental coordination for economic inter-dependence and create and maintain a strong, vibrant local economy; developing the educational, agricultural and health sectors and systems in the region and as well improve and maintain the state of security in the region.

It is also expected to work in collaboration with agencies such as National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), Presidential Committee on Distribution of Relief Materials, Victims Support Fund; Safe School Initiative, Special Committee on the Resettlement and

Rehabilitation of the IDPs, among others to facilitate successful implementation of the programme and attainment of its objectives.

PINE as an economic recovery and reconstruction strategy had been active and consistent in providing relief to internally displaced persons since its creation. Muddassir and Sanusi (2019, p.104) highlighted that:

PINE had been providing relief service since then such deployment of ambulances at strategic locations to support the evacuation of victims to hospitals and to provide first aid; it also provided comprehensive humanitarian support to many victims among the IDPs at its secure facility at Teachers Camp, Maiduguri; it set up finance feeding and sanitation centres in IDP camps; it partnered with bilateral and multilateral agencies, US Government and others in providing relief to the IDPs.

PINE in collaboration with NEMA has distributed relief materials to over 100,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the zone in 2014-2015 (Ibrahim & Ipinmoye, 2015). The agency also facilitated over 500 units of houses completed for victims of insurgency of Bulabulin-Ngarnam community in Maiduguri. The units were handed over on March 21, 2015. New housing units have also been built and delivered in Bama, Konduga, Gwoza, Yoyo in Monguno, some parts of Hawul, Kaga, to resettle victims of insurgent attacks. Schools, markets and hospitals have been rebuilt in local government areas (Muddassir & Sanusi, 2019, p. 105). The agency also worked with partners to provide safe water and life-saving health services, restore access to education by creating temporary learning spaces and deliver therapeutic treatment to malnourished children (UNICEF, cited in Muddassir & Sanusi, 2019).

However, there are damning reports of mismanagement of government funds, corruption, misappropriation and spate of thievery and criminal diversion of funds, food and other items meant to alleviate the plight of innocent Nigerians displaced by the Boko Haram insurgents by officials of the Presidential Initiative on the North East (PINE). A report by United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and National Human Rights Commission NHRC (2017) pointed out that members of PINE paid less attention to the critical needs of IDPs in the areas of housing, food, education and healthcare, but rather used the bulk of the resources on contracts that were found to have immensely benefited some public officials. It added that out of 249 trucks carrying 10, 000 metric tons of maize released by the Federal Government for the benefit of the IDPs in the six states of the North east, 65 trucks were diverted and did not reach their intended destinations (Muddassir & Sanusi, 2019, p. 106).

4. The Nigeria Foundation for the Support of Victims of Terrorism otherwise called Victims Support Fund (VSF) is an organization established to administer support to and raise awareness of the victims of Boko Haram's insurgency. It is a key initiative of the Federal Government of Nigeria, but its implementation is private sector driven. The VSF identified key priority areas like women economic empowerment, children's education, and the mainstreaming of psychosocial support for implementation. By 2016, the VSF has raised

twenty-eight out of the fifty-four billion naira pledged in 2014. By the end of 2016, ten thousand women in Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe States have benefited from the VSF's economic empowerment program which focused on fostering entrepreneurship. Also, twenty thousand children are reported to be in the VSF educational support program, with hopes of meeting the needs of over fifty thousand children (Campbell, 2016).

The VSF program supplies the children with everything they need to return to school, from books to shoes. Psychosocial support is mainstreamed throughout the VSF's initiatives and it has given grants to hospitals in Abuja, Adamawa, Borno, Gombe, Kano, Plateau, Taraba, and Yobe states in order to fill gaps in care to victims of the insurgency. As part of its mandate, the VSF is responsible for caring for all of the Chibok School girls that have been, and will hopefully be, rescued.

5. The Safe School Initiative (SSI) was launched in Nigeria in May 2014 after the kidnapping of more than 270 girls from their school in Chibok. The initiative was a series of research, campaign and programmatic activities in collaboration between Theirworld and the Global Business Coalition for Education to raise the profile of safe schools and learning environments in times of conflict and emergencies. It started with an investment from the Global Business Coalition for Education and matching contributions from the Federal Government and the international donor community, championed by A World at School (<https://theirworld.org/projects/safe-schools-initiative>).

For instance, students from high-risk areas in the three states of emergency are transferred to one of 43 federal community colleges. The program began with 2,400 students, 800 from each state. Also, 683 teachers have been trained and over 35,000 school bags with learning materials and 400 school-in-a-box kits have been distributed to support IDP learners. Suffice to say that when the new government took over power in 2015, many of the Safe Schools initiative's activities were not pursued as a policy priority. Hence, campaigners are calling for the initiative to be revived and reinstated (Global Business Coalition for Education, 2015).

Conclusion and Recommendations

This paper has attempted an appraisal of post-conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction efforts in Nigeria's Northeast. It conceptualised post-conflict peacebuilding, and reconstruction and as well examined the structural theory of conflict on which the study is anchored. It captured the geo-political structure of Northeast Nigeria and discussed the evolution and development of Boko Haram insurgency, as well as government's response to it. It further appraised post-conflict peacebuilding in the Northeast and the post-conflict reconstruction efforts of government in the region. It concluded that though significant efforts have been made towards building peace and reconstructing the destruction made in Northeast region as a result of Boko Haram attacks, however, much is still needed to be done. Therefore, efforts should be intensified to strengthen the existing initiatives while proper monitoring of their activities and adequate funding would equally go a long way in helping to achieve a timely peacebuilding and reconstruction of northeast Nigeria.

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