

Disarmament, Demobilization and Re-Integration (DDR) in Burundi: Lessons for Nigeria

By

Daniel, Wununyatu

Department Of Political Science, Federal University Wukari

Email: Dawunny2@Gmail.Com, Gsm: 07035141947

&

Paul, Solomon

Department Of Political Science, Federal University Wukari

Email: Solomonpaul74@Gmail.Com

Abstract

This paper is a probe into the application of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) in Burundi. The core interest of the paper is the possible lessons the Nigerian state could learn over the strategies employed. The article adopts a qualitative research method with reliance on the secondary sources of data and employs structural functionalism as theoretical framework to highlight the thrust of the paper. The study reveals that DDR is the United Nations programme to foster peace. The programme succeeded in Burundi as a result of internal support of the Burundi's security agents and the civil society. Also, DDR in Burundi gained momentum due to internal dynamics such as; understanding, desire for nation-building, honesty and government open policy. On the other hand, the paper unravels that rehabilitation of ex-Boko Haram combatant programme is an inborn initiative by the Nigerian government. Thus, there is need for the Nigerian government to imbibe the strategy adopted in Burundi.

Keywords: Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration, Burundi, Nigeria

Introduction

Conflict resolution and rehabilitation of ex-militant in society has evolved and is still evolving. For the United Nations, over the years, the method and mechanism for peacekeeping keep evolving and is structurally modified to meet the unique challenge of the time. Peacekeeping has a history of emerging from the traditional method to the contemporary method of diplomatic means. Therefore, Caramés (2009) observes that since the early 1990s, DDR programs, as a tool for peace building have become key security components of post-war rehabilitation especially, with numerous UN agencies and programmes involving the participation of international and local NGOs. DDR in the United Nations has become central to peacekeeping operations in the last twenty years.

Consequently, the United Nations (UN) gargantuan peace operations in ever more challenging environments have embraced the mechanism of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants and have become an integral part of peacekeeping operations and post-conflict reconstruction plans(UNDPO, 2010). There is hardly any UN peacekeeping mission that is not confronted with aspects of DDR programs. Numbers of countries have also implemented demobilization programs as part of a national security sector

reform or force reduction. DDR programs constitute a vital link between military and civilian aspects of peace operations (Ian, Colin, Michael, Kees, & Adrian, 2004).

Construing from above, Africa has been one of the primary arenas for major armed conflict, especially intrastate conflict since the end of the Cold War. Notably, there were numerous arm conflicts fought on the continent from 1990 to date, with only one of them being an interstate conflict (between Eritrea and Ethiopia) (Crystal, 2009). Burundi has witnessed a long period of civil war characterized by a process of militarization of the state, controlled by a minority group, and armed opposition from various rebel groups operating from the rural outback. Burundi eventually benefited from the Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP), set up with a trust fund under World Bank coordination to assist several countries in the Great Lakes Region to implement DDR programs (Douma & Jean, 2008).

From the foregoing, Nigeria since independence has witnessed series of crisis such as inter-ethnic crises, civil war, the Niger Delta militancy as well as the Maitatsine riots in Borno state in the early eighties. In more recent times, the country has been bedevilled with the scourge of Boko Haram insurgency. The activities of the insurgents have affected virtually most part of Nigeria with the exception of the South-South states and have gone beyond the shores of Nigeria to the neighbouring countries like Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. The Boko Haram activities have affected every sector of the country ranging from governance, security to the economic and socio-cultural life of the people, thus, making Nigeria ungovernable particularly the North Eastern part of Nigeria. It is against this backdrop that this paper attempts an examination of the implementation of DDR in Burundi and the possible lessons for the Nigerian state. The study proceeds with a conceptual clarification, a theoretical framework before an overview of DDR among other issues.

Conceptual Clarification

Some key words in this study deserve clarifications depicting their usage in the context of the paper. These are disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.

Disarmament is the collection, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian population. It includes the development of responsible arms management programmes. For the purpose of this study, disarmament remains the process of reducing weapons and the withdrawal of military forces that was undertaken in Burundi.

Demobilization is the process by which armed forces (government and/or opposition or factional forces) either downsize or completely disband, as part of a broader transformation from war to peace. Typically, demobilization involves the assembly, quartering, disarmament, administration and discharge of former combatants, who may receive some form of compensation and other assistance to encourage their transition to civilian life. In this study, it is the process of standing down of the Burundian armed forces from combat-ready status as a result of the resolution of the crisis.

Reintegration programmes are assistance measures provided to former combatants that would increase the potential for their and their families', economic and social reintegration into civil society. Reintegration programmes could include cash assistance or compensation

in kind, as well as vocational training and income generating activities. In the context of this paper, reintegration remains the process of reintegrating the soldiers back to normal civil life after the crisis that engulfed that country.

Theoretical framework

This study adopts the structural functionalist theory. Structural functionalism theory offers some insight on the subject matter because of its broad perspective. Scholars like Emile Durkheim, Malinoskiwi, Talcott Parsons, Herbert Spencer, and August Comte among others, have contributed to the development of the theory. The theory addresses the society as an organic whole in which each of its institutions work together to maintain the other. Various parts of the society are seen to be closely related and taken together as a complete system. Each of them sees the society from different views such as sociology, biology, politics etc. the summation of the theory is that every organ must work for the general success of the whole system (Talcott, 1975). Herbert Spencer sees society as the human body that all parts function together for the overall benefit of the body and that every part has its own issue that must be addressed properly. The theory sees society or polity as a complex system that works together to bring about development and growth of the society. The theory therefore looks at society in terms of functionality of its organs, institutions agents, group, etc.

Each society is complex and their institutions are also complex in nature. Thus, whether in Burundi or Nigeria, the various organs or agencies of government such as the legislature, judiciary, executive, ministries and other extra-ministerial departments, are also complex. Each of the mentioned organs of the society has goals and objectives directed at benefiting the macro-society which is the state. DDR is United Nations multidimensional post-conflict peace building and reconstruction function. Indeed, DDR programs have become commonplace in UN peacekeeping and other peace operations, and they have been used in Burundi to build security and reconstruct the social fabric and development of human capacity in that country basically to sustain long-term peace.

However, in Nigeria, the story is not quite different although the scale of the crisis in Burundi is not comparable to what is obtainable in the country. The Nigerian government has made effort to adopt some element of DDR in tackling the Boko Haram insurgency. As a matter of fact, these attempts are supported by the various government institutions and agencies such as the Nigeria Police Force, and even the Military which has worked to support the existence of government's structures and machineries by providing internal security for the lives and property of the Nigerian people. Thus, the Nigerian government has adopted and began the process for the reintegration of former Boko Haram militants into the society after their rehabilitation at the military's "Operation Safe Corridor" in the north-eastern states, and a rehabilitation programme for "low-risk" women, such as those married to Boko Haram fighters as bedrock strategy to restore peace in the Nigerian state.

DDR: An overview

The practice of DDR has evolved over the last decades as a mechanism for peacekeeping, an institutional change towards tailoring the human society. Before the 1980s; the geopolitical dimensions of the Cold War informed an approach to Post-conflict security

that focused on disarming and demobilizing military establishments and right-sizing armed forces. Bilateral partnerships provided for the development of programs for deconstructing and reforming military structures, as well as alternative employment projects and veteran pension schemes. Consequently, in the late 1980s, the UN (along with donors) was increasingly drawn into a wider set of activities, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa. This includes the growing interest in promoting democratic institutions as against military might (Koyama, 2006; UNDP, 2010).

In the early 1990s, UN agencies began to adopt a more development-oriented approach towards the success of DDR programs. These were introduced into a broader spectrum of post-conflict environments and with more comprehensive objectives which include; the livelihoods of ex-combatants and their communities, child and female soldiers, women associated with armed groups, HIV/AIDS-affected combatants, and other vulnerable groups (Charles, 2009). Therefore, from the mid-1990s, the UN embraced the DDR process as an essential element of its multidimensional post-conflict peace building and reconstruction function. Indeed, DDR programs have become commonplace in UN peacekeeping and other peace operations, and they have intended to build security and reconstruct the social fabric of and develop human capacity in, countries coming out of conflict so that a sustained, long-term peace can be established. In fact, “post-conflict peace building has become an international growth industry” (Tschirgi, 2004). It is worthy of note that it is certainly a result of responses to UN blue-ribbon panel report, at the turn of this century that called on the world body to expand its global peace support role (Andy, 2008).

From the foregoing, the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (known as the Brahimi Report) in 2000, established a link between peacekeeping, peace building, and socioeconomic development. Thus, the panel recommended a number of peace building tools and strategies that could become part of any peace support operation. These included the adoption of quick impact projects (QIPs), the establishment of a fund for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), the adoption of a “doctrinal shift” away from civilian policing to “rule of law” teams, the creation of a pilot Peace building Unit, and regularized funding of the Electoral Affairs Division at UN Headquarters in New York (Andy, 2008). Therefore, the tasks of DDR among many others involved; demobilizing ex-combatants; dismantling militia groups; identifying and resettling foreign ex-combatants, including children and women; supporting national disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programmes; promoting sensitization programs within communities; and meeting specific needs of women, children, and disabled ex-combatants (Andy, 2008).

And also, increased attention to cross-border issues, especially for the control of small arms and light weapons, for example in West Africa a broader range of weapons destruction, reduction and management measures have been introduced. These include voluntary weapons collection schemes among the civilian population, capacity-building of security forces in weapons management and the establishment of a regulatory framework for weapons possession as well as lotteries. Thus, the last seven peacekeeping operations established by the UN Security Council have all included DDR in their mandate. Similarly, the UN has increased its DDR engagement in non-peacekeeping contexts with UNDP working in over 30 countries on DDR related issues (Colletta, 2009). Besides, the UN collectively lends

considerable support in the form of personnel, finance, and other material assistance to countries coming out of conflict as well as coordinating efforts in the DDR process of other agencies and organisations from outside the UN framework. These organisations include; the European Union (EU), the African Union (AU), and ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) (Edward cited in Andy, 2008).

However, the European Union's involvement in both short-term and long-term DDR programs is quite extensive. The EU has supported about twenty of such programs in Africa since the early 1990s, through the European Commission, the European Development Fund (EDF), the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM), and the European Action on Small Arms, Light Weapons, and Explosive Remnants of War. Moreover, a substantial amount of money is contributed by EU member states to specific DDR initiatives that support time-bound, linear demobilization and reintegration programs established by the World Bank's Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) and the UN's Trust Fund for DDR (Tschirgi, 2004). According to Human Right International (2016), the EU is the biggest single contributor to the UN Trust Fund in Liberia. The trust fund has an overall budget of U.S. \$71 million, and the EU's contribution is U.S. \$21.9 million (31 per cent of the overall total) provided in three instalments. The first instalment was dedicated to the social aspects of demobilization, the establishment of a Joint Implementation Unit (JIU), and the National Commission on DDR and reintegration activities.

The second instalment went toward reintegration activities, including the provision of formal education; development of agricultural and other income generation activities; the provision of vocational training, apprenticeship; and job placement and small enterprise development. The third instalment was earmarked for the process of demobilizing the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) and for the reintegration of ex-combatants into their communities (HRI, 2016). The foregoing suggested that international institutions play a decisive role in maintaining and promoting peace in the international arena.

Burundi Crisis in retrospect

Burundi is a small country, with a mere 10,745 square miles. It also has a history of ethnic division, broadly divided between the Hutu and Tutsi. Burundi's political and ethnic conflicts dated back to the early 1960s, prior to its independence from Belgium. The original inhabitants of Burundi were the Twa who now make up only 1% of the population. In recent times, the population is divided along with the Hutu and the Tutsi. Although, the Hutu and Tutsi are said to be two different ethnic groups, scholarly excavation point out that they speak the same dialect and maintain a record of intermarriage and several cultural practices.

The state of Burundi gained independence in 1962 from Belgium and ever since then has been dominated by the Tutsi under Mwami Mwambutsa IV. Consequently, the Hutus staged a rebellion in 1965, leading to brutal Tutsi retaliation. Mwambutsa was toppled by his son, Ntare V, in 1966. Similarly, Ntare was dethroned the same year in a military coup that brought Premier Michel Micombero also a Tutsi. Thus, in 1970-1971 a civil war erupted with over 100,000 Hutu dead (Martin, Greg, & Terence, 2009).

On November 1st, 1976, another military coup was staged by Lt. Col. Jean-Baptiste Bagaza who assumed the presidency. However, in September 1987, Bagaza's government was overthrown by Major Pierre Buyoya, who became president. In the light of the political domination of Tutsi over the Hutus in Burundi, another major crackdown flames up leading to the assassination of about 20,000 Hutu. Thus, Buyoya began democratic reforms to salvage the country's ethnic crack. The Burundi Democratic Front's candidate, Melchior Ndadaye, won the country's first democratic presidential elections, held on June 2nd, 1993. Ndadaye, the first Hutu to assume power in Burundi, was killed within months during a coup. The second Hutu president, Cyprien Ntaryamira, was killed on April 6th, 1994, when the plane conveying him and the Rwandan President was shot down. As a result, Hutu youth gangs began massacring Tutsi and the Tutsi well-armed retaliated by killing Hutus (Elechi, 2017).

From its inception, Burundi is a prototype of poor governance and murky economic performance. Putting the state at the centre of economic activity the ruling elite have ensured that their hold on political power guarantees them total control over the economy and its rents. The leaders have allocated public investment and public employment to benefit members of their group. The domestic economy has been shaped not to encourage production and growth but to generate rents enjoyed by those in power (Nkurunziza & Ngaruko, 2005). A chunk of Burundi's history has been dominated by military dictatorships. Three military Tutsi presidents have been at the helm of the country for 34 years out of 41 since the country's independence in 1962. It is apt to note that, the country has recorded five major civil wars that have claimed more than 500,000 lives and have produced about a million refugees.

DDR in Burundi

The application of DDR in Burundi gained momentum following the cease-fire agreement of November 15, 2003, between the warring parties. The Arusha Peace Agreement spelt out specific arrangements for the establishment of a national army and for the implementation of the DDR process. This monumental move was initiated through the collaboration of UN and OAU (now AU). Thus, strategic mechanisms were created such as; National Programme for DDR, which ultimately was placed under the auspices of the National Committee for DDR (NCDDR), a Joint Operations Plan (JOP) was also developed to facilitate the implementation of the various DDR phases (Martin, Greg, & Terence, 2009). It is apt to note that, in Burundi, there were about 55,000 ex-combatants which comprises of child soldiers of the Burundian Armed Forces (FAB), 20,000 members of the government militia and 10,000 members of the Parties of Armed Political Movements (PMPA). The Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) of the World Bank provided a framework for all of the partners that supported the DDR process in Burundi (Andy, 2008).

Consequently, the applications of DDR in Burundi succeeded to disarm 10,000 ex-combatants, including 2,700 child soldiers and were demobilized by June 2005. On the humanitarian ground, eighteen months of wages were paid to the ex-combatants in three equal instalments. Besides, child ex-combatants were placed under the care of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), and women and the disabled were placed in a special reintegration programme. It should be noted that the DDR programme in Burundi was linked

strategically with the broader Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) and Security Sector Reform (SSR) developed for Burundi (UN, 2007).

Consequently, a national committee was established to oversee and implement the demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants with the UN-mandated force, in this case, the United Nations Operation in Burundi (UNOB) facilitating and assisting the process. At the core of the programme were the implementation of security sector reform and the design of a comprehensive social reintegration package in Burundi. Evidently, 5,412 ex-combatants have benefited from targeted economic support, and about 3,300 of whom are now engaged in income-generating activities” across Burundi and many of the demobilized child soldiers returned to school and are participating in vocational training (UN, 2007).

However, in spite of the level of DDR success in Burundi, there were some challenges. Notably, not all warring parties signed the peace agreement. Therefore, it created a strenuous environment for the OAU (now AU) and the UN peacekeeping forces to create the needed security environment for the DDR process to be properly implemented within the shortest possible time. Similarly, due to the lack of trust between the various warring parties, disarmament has not been a holistic phenomenon in Burundi. Thus, the mistrust that remains between some of the conflicting parties on the other hand, gradually lower the level of conflict between the combatants.

DDR in Burundi: Lessons for Nigeria

Since independence in 1960, Nigeria has witnessed various forms of instability. These range from the Tiv riots in 1962 to the 1964-65 post-election violence; the 1966 first military coup d'état, the Isaac Adaka Boro uprising in 1966; the counter coup d'état of 1966, the Nigerian Civil war that commenced in 1966; the Agbekoya Parapo Revolt of 1968-69 to the anti-SAP riots of 1989; the 12 June 1993 post-annulment riots, the Odua People's Congress saga of 1994-2003; the Niger Delta militancy and the current Boko Haram insurgency (Gilbert, 2013; Gilbert, 2010). In fact, with the exception of the Biafran secessionist war that violently threatened the corporate existence of Nigeria, none of the aforementioned cases of instability has rattled and challenged the Nigerian state as the Boko Haram insurgency.

Boko Haram's origin is traceable to the 1990's when it's pioneer leader Abu Yusuf Mohammed Yusuf, popularly known as Mohammed Yusuf led a radical Salafist Islamic youth group called Shababul Islam meaning Islamic Youth Vanguard (ICG, 2014). Scholars, generally hold the view that it was formally established in 2002 with the name Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal Jihad, meaning "people Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad" (Gilbert, 2014). Therefore, by 2003, the group had enlarged and started having brushes with security agencies due to their unlawful proclivities, which was accentuated by their varied linkages to the same political class they originally set out to criticize and condemn (ICG, 2014; Onuoha, 2012). This continued through 2004 and the refusal of the Nigerian state to nip their activities in the bud endeared them to several youths and thus, made their recruitment drive highly successful. However in 2009, cognizant of the subversive tendencies of the group, the Bauchi state government restricted them from public preaching and further recruitment of converts. Already enraged, they characteristically disobeyed the motorbike helmet law and in an attempt by Nigerian security forces to compel obedience from them, a major conflict crisscrossing four states (Bauchi, Borno, Kano and

Yobe) ensued (Onuoha, 2012). The fight and riots lasted for five days until Boko Haram was eventually overpowered by the Nigerian military in Maiduguri, Yusuf was arrested, detained and he died in police custody. And it was recorded that between 700 and 800 of his members also died (Sergie & Johnson, 2014; Meehan & Speier, 2010).

Consequently, Boko Haram went underground and re-emerged in 2010 under the leadership of Abubakar Shekau as a more dynamic and vicious insurgent group fighting against the Nigerian state for the revenge of the death of its pioneer leader. The resurgence of the group since 2010 has constituted a distressing security predicament to the Nigerian state as they have blatantly and unjustifiably embarked on a systematic destruction of lives and property. The dexterousness, sophistication and variability of Boko Haram within the North East geopolitical zone has become a major dilemma for the Nigerian state.

The protracted Boko Haram war has attracted numerous state responses to end the carnage. Both counterterrorism and counterinsurgency measures employed by Nigeria and other affected neighbouring states (Chad, Niger, and Cameroon) have not produced the expected results. The ensuing impasse has not ended killings, displacement and disruption of livelihoods in the war zone. In fact, to quell the violent activities of the Boko Haram sect, President Goodluck Jonathan (2010 - 2015) and Muhammadu Buhari (2015- current), have led an all-out campaign (the Nigerian military and police) to drive Boko Haram fighters out of their strongholds and hideouts. Also, Local vigilante groups fought side by side with the government forces and played an essential role in intelligence-sharing, combat missions and stabilization support. As of early 2018, population centres in North-Eastern Nigeria once controlled by Boko Haram are mostly clear of its active presence.

Relative calm has been restored in these places and normal day-to-day activities have resumed. However, low-intensity fighting, guerrilla-style attacks and security incidents caused by dispersed Boko Haram fighters, including female suicide bombers, still take place in isolated pockets of resistance. Importantly, many rural areas outside the government-controlled population centres remain insecure, because of the sustained presence and infiltration of Boko Haram fighters. It is thus, obvious that the violent and hard power mechanism employed by the Nigerian government against the Boko Haram seem not to have been the best of options in dealing with the insurgents. Burundi, in the first phase of its predicament employed the hard power method achieved minimal result of as peace remained elusive just as evident today in Nigeria. The hard power approach may grant immediate result but not a long lasting outcome to guarantee peace and harmony in the society.

Thus, the Nigerian government in recent times has adopted and began the process for the reintegration of former Boko Haram militants into the society after their rehabilitation at the military's "Operation Safe Corridor" in the north-eastern states, and a rehabilitation programme for "low-risk" women, such as those married to Boko Haram fighters as bedrock strategy to restore peace in the Nigerian state (Xinhua, 2019). The initiative was first proposed at the Nigerian National Security Council (NSC) meeting in September 2015, after which repentant Boko Haram members were encouraged to surrender and embrace peace (Mules, 2019). However, to move forward, the Federal government of Nigeria, through the Defence Headquarters inaugurated the Operation Safe Corridor (OSC) in 2016. The OSC

programme is a counterinsurgency approach aimed at rehabilitating low-risk repentant Boko Haram fighters and reintegrates them back into society. The rehabilitation programme involves vocational training as well as access to deradicalization and civic programmes. So far, the Nigerian Army says it has rehabilitated 893 ex-Boko Haram members since 2019. Meanwhile, the Nigerian Identity Management Commission said it has registered about 900 repentant Boko Haram members in the country (Nigeria Crisis Response Plan, 2020).

The approach to the rehabilitation programme in Nigeria differs from that of Burundi. Rehabilitation in Burundi was a United Nation's programme, the national committee was established to oversee and implement the demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants with the UN-mandated force, while the Burundi security agents facilitated and assisted the process which was devoid of personal and religious sentiments as the case in Nigeria. Moreover, government programmes and policies are expected to have direct impact on the population. The rehabilitation programmes were limited to cities and people closer to the government and high level of insecurity maintained among people living in the hinterland. It required that, given the diversity of actors involved in the various stages, and the overlapping nature of many of the phases, integrated planning, effective coordination and unity of command are essential. Past experiences have highlighted the need for the various actors to work complementarily, avoiding unnecessary competition for funds and visibility.

On the other hand, it is obvious, DDR programme in Burundi was linked strategically with the broader Poverty Reduction Strategy and Security Sector Reform (SSR) developed for Burundi. Unemployment situation in Nigeria is worrisome. Nigeria's unemployment rate according to the NBS is 18.8 per cent which means that nearly 1 in 5 aspiring workers do not have formal jobs, especially in the North-East States of Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba and Yobe (Suleiman 2012) where unemployment rate stood at 13 per cent. Most educational institution in the country turns out thousands of graduates every year but there are no institutional arrangements for their employment (Okorie 2011). In a bid to survive, many of them are agitated resulting in violence and criminal activities against the society. These come in the form of kidnappings, religious fanaticism and suicide bombings, among others. In fact, violent, conflicts, whether social, political or environmental according to Adejumo (2011) have seriously contributed to the crises situation in terms of loss of human lives and material capital. Employment opportunities which are out of place has weakened social safety and caused a decline in the capacity of the state to provide services to sectors like health, education and indeed security for the people (Onouha, 2011). Thus, there is need for external linkage to widen the scope of the rehabilitation programme with the aim to secure effective monitoring, thus, actualising the goals of the programme.

The amnesty for Boko Haram has been trailed by stiff opposition. Many victims of Boko haram insurgency have reiterated their opposition in accepting back into their communities, prospective rehabilitated ex-insurgents. Therefore, Government must prioritise the influence of those affected by the insurgency. The Nigerian state must ensure that direct victims of Boko Haram insurgency accept the principle of dialogue and support the process. It is the buy-in of Boko Haram-impacted communities and designated resettlement locations that will, to a large extent, determine the success of the programme. The Nigerian state must

also pay heed to concerned collective voices in the terror-troubled area. Arguably, the amnesty programme for repentant low-risk Boko Haram members may seem like a good path to peace, it may also create inherent problems if not properly implemented. Consequently, such amnesty should not emerge from a point of weakness; otherwise, it will not meet its objectives. To this end, the roles of the peacekeeping military and humanitarian agencies and non-governmental organizations should be seen as complementary in providing assistance during the demobilization and reintegration phases. The integrated approach in planning and implementation of humanitarian assistance programmes is essential, and mechanisms for coordination should be included as soon as possible, for example when translating the peacekeeping mandate into Standard Operating Procedures.

Additionally, counterinsurgency measures by the Nigerian state must involve all actors in the conflict. According to the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), the voices of the community must be magnified when considering dialogue as a counter-terrorism intervention. ISS projects that community actors are best placed to understand the required concessions and possible successes of any dialogue process. Besides, since communities are directly affected by the conflict and the reintegration programmes, their buy-in is vital for the success and sustainability of the initiative.

Conclusion

The crisis in the state of Burundi boiled down to the emergence and nature of the state. The crisis between the Tutsi and the Hutu is a creation of the colonial government headed by Belgium; the state that emerged after independence took on the character of the latter colonial masters and became elitist and strived to continue to dominate. The character of the ruling class also demonstrates weakness and corruption towards addressing the developmental needs of the state, rather the post-colonial state sought perpetuation in power even against the constitutional stipulated terms, thereby leading to more crisis. DDR program has emerged as UN tool to foster peace in intra-State conflict. Arm conflict has become a recurring decimal in human society, especially in Africa. Besides, the United Nations (UN) peace operations incorporated the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) Programmes as a means of peacekeeping operations and post-conflict reconstruction plans. The DDR process in Burundi gained momentum following the cease-fire agreement between the warring parties. However, Nigeria's case is yet to yield favourable results as the activities of the insurgents continues unabated. The only hope is wrapped in the thinking that in no distance time, the Boko Haram insurgents will see the need to down their arms and embrace dialogue as the way forward. Doing just that will also allow for a proper DDR in Nigeria particularly with respect to the North East geopolitical zone of the country.

References

- Adejumo, A. (2011). The Problems and Challenges of Insecurity in Nigeria. http://newsdiaryonline.com/tok_security.html Retrieved April 23, 2020
- Andy, K. W. (2008). Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Post-Conflict Peace building in Africa: An Overview. *Journal of African Security*, Volume 1, Issue 1, pp. 24-52.

- Bellamy, A. J. (2010). "The Responsibility to Protect – Five Years On". *Ethics & International Affairs* 24(2), p. 143 – 169
- Caramés, A. & Sanz, E. (2009). *Analysis of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) Programmes in the World During 2008*. Bellaterra: School for a Culture of Peace,
- Charles, C. (2009). 'UN Peace Operations and State Building: A Case Study of Haiti.' New York: Centre on International Cooperation.
- Colletta, N. J. & Robert, M. (2009). 'Rethinking Post-war Security Promotion: From Interim Stabilization and Second-Generation Security Promotion.' *The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance*. Vol. 2, NO 3, Pp. 23-30.
- Evans, G. (2006). "From Humanitarian Intervention to the Responsibility to Protect" *Wisconsin International Law Journal* 24(3), p. 703 – 722.
- Evans, G. (2012). "Forward" In Breakey, H. & Francis, A. & Popovski, V. & Sampford, C. & Smith, M.G. & Thakur, M.G. (eds). *Enhancing Protection Capacity: A Policy Guide to the Responsibility to Protect and the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflicts*. Australia: Institute for Ethics, Governance and Law.
- Fatai, A. A., & Mohammed, L.B. (2013). *Introduction to International Relations*. Ilorin, Nigeria: College Press & Publishers Limited.
- Garwood-Gowers, A. (2013). "The BRICS and the Responsibility to Protect in Libya and Syria". In Maguire, R., Lewis, B. & Sampford, V. (eds). *Shifting Global Powers and International Law: Challenges and Opportunities*. Great Britain: Routledge.
- Gilbert, L.D (2013). Revisiting Ethno-nationalism in the Niger Delta of Nigeria: An Interrogation of its Achievements and Prospects. *International Affairs and Global Strategy*, 16, 50-56.
- Gilbert, L.D (2010). Ethnic Militias and Conflict in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria: The International Dimensions (1999-2009). Doctoral Thesis Submitted to University of KwaZulu-Natal, Howard College Campus, South Africa.
- Gilbert, L. D. (2014) Prolongation of Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria: The International Dimensions. *Research on Humanities and Social Sciences*, www.iiste.org Vol.4, No.11, pp. 150-156
- Human Rights Institutions (2016). Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration A Guide for National Human Rights Institutions.
- International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) (2001) *Report on The Responsibility to Protect*. Canada: International Development Research Centre.
- International Crisis Group (ICG) (2014) Curbing Violence in Nigeria (II): The Boko Haram Insurgency. www.crisisgroup.org › africa › west-africa › nigeria
- Koyama, S. (2006). 'Comparative Analysis of Evaluation Methodologies in Weapon Collection Programmes.' Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research.
- Martin, E., Greg, M. & Terence, M. (2009). Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Local Ownership in the Great Lakes: The Experience of Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, *African Security*. Vol.2, NO.1, Pp.29-58, <http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/uafs20>

- Meehan, P. & Spier, J. (2011). Boko Haram: Emerging threat to the U.S. homeland. <https://www.google.com.ng/#q=Boko+haram%3A+Emerging+threat+to+the+U.S.+homeland> Retrieved 19 October, 2020
- Netherlands Institute of International Relations (2006) *Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: Mapping Issues, Dilemmas and Guiding Principles*. Hague, Netherlands: Carola van der Heiden.
- Onuoha, F. (2012). The Islamist Challenge: Nigeria's Boko Haram Crisis Explained. *African Security Review*, 19(2), 54-67.
- Okorie, I. (2011), "Insecurity" Consequences for Investment and Employment, *The Punch*, September 9, pp.37-38.
- Suleiman, T. (2012). A Smell of Boko Haram, *Tell Magazine*, September 17, 46-49
- Sergie, M. & Johnson, T. (2014). Boko Haram. Retrieved from <http://www.cfr.org/nigeria/boko-haram/p25739> on 5th June, 2020.
- Tschirgi, N. (2004). "Post-conflict Peacebuilding Revisited: Achievements, Limitations, Challenges" paper prepared for the WSP International/IPA Peacebuilding Forum Conference, October 7, New York: International Peace Academy.
- United Nations Nepal Information Platform (2007) "What is the Role of the UN and UNDP in DDR?" <http://www.un.org.np/ddr/role.php> , accessed Dec. 1, 2019.
- United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (2010). *Second Generation Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Practices in Peace Operations*. New York, USA: Madison Ave.
- United Nations (2000) *Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peace-keeping Operations in All Their Aspects*. UN Doc. No.: A/54/839. New York: United Nations.
- Xinhua, S. Y. (2019). Nigeria begins reintegration of 983 ex-Boko Haram militants into society. <http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-11/02/c14931947.htm>; charset=utf-8,%3Cp%3EABUJA%2C(%EF%B7%90Xinhua%EF%B7%AF) Retrieved Nov. 2, 2020.

Author's Bio-data

Daniel, Wununyatu is a lecturer in the Department of Political Science, Federal University Wukari, Taraba State, Nigeria. He specializes in international relations.

Paul, Solomon teaches political science in the Department of Political Science, Federal University Wukari, Taraba State, Nigeria. His research interests include diplomacy, conflict and inter-state relations.