



The Political Economy of Federalism in Nigeria

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Abstract

There is ample evidence that Nigeria's federal system faces major operational and institutional difficulties. However, this paper examined the difficulties bedeviling the Nigeria's federal system. In building the body of the work, the paper employed qualitative method in collating information and the paper followed the assumptions and postulations of the classical model of federalism which is associated with Kenneth Wheare. In plural societies the theory posits, federalism is about equality and equity, justice and fairness amongst both the constituent units. But conversely, this paper found out that the political economy of federalism in Nigeria is bedeviled with over concentration of power at the center, resource control and sharing formula crisis, the insincerity of the federal government and sectional domination of power in the federal system. Therefore, the consequences of these anti-federalist arrangement are: clamor for restructuring, continue agitation for secession by some aggrieved groups and threatened national unity and development. The paper however, recommended among others that, all remnants of the unitary system of government should be eradicated, and the states should be given the freedom and autonomy that is consistent with federalism. Also, the law that vested all mineral resources under the soil of Nigeria with the federal government should be reviewed. And finally, government especially at federal level must be sincere, honest, transparent and accountable to her citizens.

Keywords: Federalism, Restructuring, Politics, Economy.

Introduction

Before the arrival of British colonialists, the area now known as Nigeria was inhabited by people who belonged to different empires, kingdoms and societies which were traditionally administered and, relationship between these various entities was characterized by much conflict and little co-operation (Agan and Yusuf, 2020). However, effective British occupation of the area known as Nigeria today, took place by the Royal Niger Company. Consequent upon this, three separate territories emerged. These were Lagos protectorate, Northern protectorate and Southern protectorate.





However, the origin of federal system in Nigeria can be traced to the amalgamation of the Southern and Northern protectorates in 1914. The federal structures began to form under the Richard and Macpherson constitutions of 1946 and 1951 respectively though they only created the centralized unitary system. The practice of federalism in Nigeria was officially adopted through the Lyttleton constitution of 1954 as it was the first genuine federal constitution of the country. The constitution was introduced due to the crisis generated by the Macpherson constitution, especially the motion for self-government and the Kano riot of 1953. These events convinced the colonial administration that considerable regional autonomy must be granted to the regional governments and that only federalism could hold the Nigerian people together.

Nigeria's federalism became manifest at independence, and since then, it has been operating in both political and fiscal contexts, although not in full consonance with the basic principles of federal practice. Historically, Nigeria's federal system has oscillated between the excessive regionalism that marked the first republic (1960-1966) and the excessive centralization of power especially during the military and post-military era. Nigerian federalism overtime has also undergone structural changes by which the federation moved from its initial three regional structure at independence to a four regional structure by 1964, and to its current 36 states structure including 774 local governments. These changes have been necessitated by the need for a balance federation that will give all nationalities self-actualization and fulfillment. The objective of this paper however is to examine the difficulties bedeviling Nigeria's federal system and the political economy therein with a view to exposing or bringing to fore the political dynamics vis a vis the economic intricacy or complexity.

Operationalization of key Terms

The key concepts to define or operationalize in this paper are; political economy and federalism.

Political economy; is the study of the interaction of politics and economics. Political economy is concerned with the interaction of political and economic processes in a society, the distribution of power and wealth between different groups and individuals, and the processes that create, sustain and transform these relationships over time. Political economy begins with the political nature of decision making and is concerned with how politics affects economic choices in a society. Society here is defined broadly to include not only countries or other such jurisdictions, but also firms, social groups, or other organizations. These definitions draw particular attention to politics, understood in terms of contestation and bargaining between interest groups with competing claims over rights and resources. However, it is equally concerned with the economic processes that generate wealth, and that influence how political choices are made. In reality these processes are closely inter-related and part of a unified set of dynamics which influence development outcomes. According to Ezeibe (2016, p:1), 'political economy is a very old discipline in social sciences that studies the dynamic interaction and parallel existence between the state and the economy as well as wealth and power. It dates back to the world of the classical economists like Adam Smith and David Ricardo who applied Says law as the moving force of the entire economic

system'. Political economy therefore, is the study of production and trade and their relations with law, custom and government; and with the distribution of national income and wealth.

Federalism

Federalism is derived from the Latin word "foedus" meaning covenant. It is a political concept in which a group of members are bound together by covenant with a governing representative head. The term is also used to describe a system of government in which sovereignty is constitutionally divided between a central governing authority and constitutional political units (like states or provinces). It has been agreed at many fora that the discussion of contemporary federalism seems to have started with Kenneth C. Wheare who sees federalism as a constitutional arrangement which divides the lawmaking powers and functions between two levels of government in such a way that each within its respective spheres of jurisdiction and competence, is independent and coordinate in status (Wheareas cited in Majekodunmi, 2015). While Nwabueze (1983), sees federalism as an arrangement whereby powers of government within a country are shared between a national, country-wide government and a number of regionalized (that is territorially localized) government in such a way that exists as a government separately and independently from others operating directly on person and property within its territorial area, with a will of its own apparatus for the conduct of its affairs, and with authority in some matters exclusive of all the others.

Theoretical Postulation

This paper followed the assumptions and postulations of the classical model of federalism which is associated with Kenneth Wheare (1963). In plural societies, federalism is about equality and equity, justice and fairness amongst both the constituent units and the communal groups that comprises it. It is also about special mobilization and utilization of societal resources in a manner that facilitates balance growth and development. Its operation is predicated upon constitutionalism, respect for the rule of law, and executive responsibility and lawfulness.

This model basic assumptions as advanced by Nweke, Kazeem and Orija (cited in Agan and Yusuf, 2020) are that, a division of powers exists between one general and several regional governments, each of which is coordinate with the others in its own sphere; each government must act directly on the people; each must be limited to its own sphere of action; and each must be independent of the others within that sphere. Given the foregoing, it is evident that a written and strict constitution is required in order to accomplish the necessary division of powers capable of assuring clear independence and coordination between national and federating institutions. As such, the constitution is supreme in a federal state.

Jega (1996) supports this thesis by stating that, unlike the unitary system, the capabilities of the federating units in a federation are inherent and not derived. They are constitutionally projected as a crucial aspect that cannot be overestimated in the functioning of federalism because they are not the prerogative of the national government, but rather an action of the constitution. According to the liberal model of federalism's premises, the Nigerian federal state arrangement has been beset by a slew of issues that have threatened the country's unity and corporate survival since independence. That is to say that, fiscal federalism forms the foundation upon which societal coalescence: acquiescence and dissent

are built and appreciated. In Nigeria however, constituent nationalities live in mutual suspicion, fear and weak tolerance.

As a result of this, the issue of fiscal federalism has remained largely disagreeable, contentious and disaggregating. These problems of fiscal federalism, resource control and sharing formula crisis, over-concentration of power in the center vis-a-vis sectional domination of power either in isolation or by its combinations with other factors, culminates into incessant agitations or call for restructuring of Nigeria's federal structure. This continuously undermines social cohesion, social engineering and national integration. And the fallout of these disaggregating indices leaves the polity in a throes of break up trained in parochial and ethnic contraptions.

The Evolution and Current State of Nigeria's Federalism

With well over 250 ethno-linguistic groups, some of which are bigger than many independent states of contemporary Africa, Nigeria is a country that is both diverse and complex. This complexity is a reflection of the avalanche of ethno-cultural and religious groups co-habiting the region and the subtleties of interaction among them. Ojo (cited in Majekodunmi, 2009). Nigerian federalism is a creation of the British. Before the arrival of British colonialists, the area now known as Nigeria was inhabited by peoples who belonged to different empires, kingdoms and societies, which were traditionally and independently administered. The relationship between these various entities was characterized by much conflict and little cooperation. Furthermore, such vices as cannibalism, ritual murder and the killing of twins were rampant among some of the peoples (Adigwe, 1974). The arrival of British and other European explorers, merchants and religious missionaries tempered and eventually reduced these vices to the barest minimum. Following a series of attempts at pacification and conquest, three different regions arose. These were Lagos, the Southern Nigerian Protectorate and the Northern Nigerian Protectorate (Nyekwere & Duson, 2020).

The federal system in Nigeria, on the other hand, may be traced back to the 1914 merger of the Southern and Northern Protectorates. The Richard and Macpherson constitutions of 1946 and 1951 respectively only created a decentralized unitary system. The practice of federalism in Nigeria was officially adopted through the Lyttleton Constitution of 1954 as it was the first genuine federal constitution of the country. The constitution was introduced due to the crises generated by the Macpherson constitution, especially the motion for self-government, and the Kano riots of 1953. These incidents persuaded the colonial authority that the regional administrations needed significant regional autonomy and that only federalism could keep the Nigerian people together. As a result, a federation of three regions was formed, each designated by one of the three major ethnic groups that is Yoruba, Igbo and Hausa Fulani. Though Nigeria, in theory, is said to have practiced Federalism since 1954 but, evidence is on the contrary. That is, the government is progressively tending toward a unitary state. This is particularly true in the field of the sharing of roles and resources between the central government and the component units, on the one hand, and between the government and the citizens, on the other (Ajagun, 2004).

Nigeria's federalism, like all federal systems, has operated in both fiscal and political contexts since its introduction in 1954. The political environment is concerned with the construction of proper mechanisms that would support component unit self-realization, while the fiscal context is concerned with the form of expropriation and resource distribution. One



fundamental fact is that the process of federalism in both cases needs to be structured in such a way as to prevent marked disparity between the power and resource matrix component units. Indeed, it has been observed that financial subordination of units or marked inequalities between them in terms of wealth, population and land mass are powerful destabilizing factors in federations and can end federalism (Wheare, 1963; Awa, 1976). In the fiscal context, there is no doubt that profound conflict exists among the component units of the Nigerian federation. At inception of the system, there was a large devolution of powers to the regions. Equally, each region enjoys considerable autonomy over its internal affairs in addition to having a regional police force and civil service. In terms of resource distribution, the principle of derivation occupied a significant place in the distribution formula. This followed recommendations of the Louis Chick Commission of 1953 which was set up to 'assess the effect, on the public expenditure of Nigeria as whole, of the reallocation of functions between the center and the regions' (Elaigwu, 2005). Thus, derivation remained a major emphasis in federal revenue allocation between 1954 and 1966 when the military took over headship of the country, albeit some other commissions were set up whose recommendations led to some minor modifications in the revenue sharing arrangement.

Nigeria's pre-military federal system was substantially different from the post-military federal structure during the time now known as the First Republic. The three and subsequently four regions were fully autonomous federating units in the pre-military federal system. Each region had its own laws and constitution, with a premier as the head of government. Each had its own police force, whereas the Nigerian police force was maintained by the federal government. Equally, each region was allowed to have its representatives in some foreign countries. They were designated agents, not ambassadors although they functioned practically in that capacity. Also, each region had the symbol of its own authority. None of them was totally or near totally dependent on the center for its fiscal and other needs. Each region was strong enough and rich enough to take care of itself. The main criticism of this arrangement was that the regions were too powerful and the center was too weak for a meaningful federal system and national unity. The regions, given the degree of their autonomy, tended to treat the federal government with disdain. The federal government could not impose its will on the federating units. It was generally felt that if this continued, things would eventually fall apart (Ebegbulem, 2011). The 1960 and 1963 Constitutions devolved tremendous powers to the regions, which unto themselves, became fulcrums of political power. Regionalism was nurtured or realized to the extent that the equilibrium between centrifugal and centripetal political forces, which true federalism addresses, became much more academic than real.

Nigerian federalism weakened after the military took over power in 1966 because, hierarchical command structure was formed, and the regions' independence was jeopardized. The states that replaced the regions became only extensions of the central government, which became extremely powerful. Surprisingly, the military arrived at a time when oil was overtaking cocoa, groundnut, and palm oil in popularity. Even more interesting was the fact that the oil deposits were found in states controlled by minority ethnic groups with very little say in the administration of the nation. It is therefore beyond coincidence that the principle of derivation was cancelled, and the rights and control of the natural endowments of the Niger Delta were transferred to the federal government.





In its structural and political context, Nigeria's federalism may be likened to a biological cell capable of dividing and reproducing itself (Dent, 1995). This is because, it has continued to witness continuous splitting of units. It started out as a three-region federation in 1954, but by 1964, it had expanded to four with the addition of the mid-western region from the western area. The federal government was divided into 12 states by 1967, and 19 states by 1976. It had fragmented to become a federation of 36 states by 1996, after becoming a federation of 21 states in 1989, and 30 in 1991. Furthermore, the emergence of new states has always been accompanied by the creation of new Local Governments. As a result, there are now 774 Local Government Area Councils in the country, up from 301 in 1976.

The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria recognizes three tiers of government: federal, state, and local with a presidential system akin to that of the USA, and a bicameral legislature (a senate of 109 members and 360 members of the lower House of Representatives). The 1999 Constitution, in Section 4 (Second Schedule), indicates the Exclusive Legislative List, consisting of the responsibilities on which only the federal government can act, for example currency, foreign affairs, security etc. A Concurrent Legislative List, on which both the federal and the state governments can act, with responsibility such as, education, health, housing, transport etc. In addition, Section 4 (7a) assigns the so-called residual functions to state governments. These are functions not specified either in the Exclusive List or the Concurrent Legislative List.

Implicit in the above description is that Nigeria's federal structure is predicated on a three-tier administrative structure – the federal, state and local governments. While it is not a misnomer to have, in a federation, more than two tiers of government in order to cope with the extent of diversities, the continued structural division, however, have not produced a satisfactory outcome for the component units. This is evidently so because every attempt at states and local government creation is usually followed by increase agitations for more (Muhammad, 2007).

The Political Economy of Nigeria's Federalism

As noted earlier, political economy is concerned with the interaction of political and economic processes in a society, the distribution of power and wealth between different groups and individuals, and the processes that create, sustain and transform these relationships over time. And federalism is a political system aimed at creating harmony from intrinsic or inherent political, social and economic asymmetry vis-a-vis ethnic heterogeneity. However, the political economy of Nigeria federalism in this paper is focused on the following issues;

(a) Resource Control and Sharing Formula Crisis: Nigeria has a system in which the federal government harnesses natural resources and distributes revenue to states and local governments, which differs from an ideal federal system in which regions or states as federating units control resources in their territory. These factors of resource control and sharing formula are indeed hindering the proper functioning of federalism in Nigeria. Since independence, there has always been difficulty in terms of the control and administration of resources removed from the authorities of states or local governments such resources are found. In 1989, the federal government agreed to a formula for the central government - 50%,

states - 30%, local governments - 15% and special funds - 5%. This was together with allocation principles among the states as: equality - 40%, population - 30%, land mass - 10%, social development - 10% and internal revenue effort - 10% Onuoha and Nwanegbo (as cited in Shehu, Bin Othman and Osman, 2017, pp. 242-243). It is noteworthy that at those respective times, the federal government had taken 55% (1981), 50% (1990) and 48.5% (1992).

There was a modification in 2002 through the Modification Order Act of July, 2002 which provided for revenue sharing as Federal Government – 54.68% (FG 48.5%, FCT 1%, Derivation and Ecology 1.46%, Stabilization Fund 0.72% and Minerals Development 3%); States 24.72; and Local Governments 20.60%. The Act was further modified under the Obasanjo regime in 2004 which brought the current sharing formula of Federal Government 52.68% (FG 48.5%, FCT 1%, Derivation and Ecology 1%, Stabilization 0.50% and Natural Resources Development 1.68%); States Governments 26.72 (Equality 40%, Population 30%, land Mass and Terrain 10%, Social Development 10% and Internal Revenue Generation 10%) and Local Governments 20.60%. The oil producing states (Abia, Akwalbom, Bayelsa, Cross-Rivers, Delta, Imo, Ondo and Rivers) also enjoy 13% as derivation in addition to their respective shares from the 26.72% (Shehu et. al. 2017).

No doubt resource control has remained the most contentious issue among the three tiers of government as well as among the regions in the country. For instance, the former Niger State Governor who doubled as the Chairman of Northern Governors Forum, Dr. Babangida Aliyu, while inaugurating the Advisory Council of Sir Ahmadu Bello Memorial Foundation in Abuja in 2012, ascribed the underdevelopment and poverty in Northern Nigeria to the poor allocations the 19 states in the region receive from the federation account. He equally sees the 13 per cent derivation allotted to oil-producing states as cheating on the northerners and therefore, called for its scrapping (Adegbami, 2013). Prior to Governor Aliyu's outburst, the former Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), Mallam Lamido Sanusi, had claimed in an interview with Financial Times of London, that the low financial allocation to the northern states was the major reason for the underdevelopment and activities of such groups as Boko Haram.

The struggle for the control of the nation's resources according to Ikeji (cited in Nwede, Dauda & Orija, 2018) has been based on the regional "cleavages" and entangled with political conflict. Resource control has thus been associated with political considerations with the purpose of influencing wealth allocation from the federation account. The political economy of resource control according to Orji and Jaja (cited in Nwede et. al, 2018) has assumed the status of an impediment to the socio-economic development and political stability of Nigeria's democracy.

To this extent therefore, they warn that unless some urgent meaningful steps are taken, there will be no socio-economic progress in Nigeria. They thus advise that, any workable step at the resolution of the conflict associated with resource control must adopt a holistic approach. This is because the degree of violent issues relating to resource control has reached its crescendo to the extent that the political stability and socio-economic development of the nation is being threatened. The reasons given for the violent reaction



especially on the part of Niger Delta communities include deprivation, and environmental pollution which has consequently bred youth restiveness and militarism in the region.

(b) Over-concentration of power at the Center: It is crystal clear that what is currently practicable in Nigeria is over-concentration of powers at the center as against the philosophy of a true federalism. Federalism requires that each tier of government be autonomous, which means that the State and Local governments must be free of the Central government in terms of powers (legislative and judicial), finances, and appointments, among other things. Nigeria fails to provide this critical component of a federal state. As expressed in the Nigerian Constitution of 1999, this challenge has been planned to remain as such. The submission made by Nkwede (2013: 76) is apt in this regard:

The components of the federation - the states today, depend almost entirely on the center for security, finance, roads, schools, health facilities, power, employment, water, industries, etc. The situation is so pervasive such that if the center delays in releasing funds due to the states to them, there is tension, chaos and doubt because the states cannot even pay salaries, let alone prosecuting their development programs on their own.

Incontrovertibly, smaller units (States and Local) of government in the present Nigeria lack requisite power, geographic span of control, and knowledge of resources, to cope with inescapable issues related to economic stability and development, and are unable to assume satisfaction of basic needs and broadening wants which cannot be neglected in the age of the common man. This is to the detriment of effective governance and development of these federating units, no wonder there is a general clamor for restructuring of the present federal structure in Nigeria for a return to the 1963 structure (constitution).

Atiku captured in an editorial in Vanguard Newspaper lamented that the Federal government is too big and powerful relative to the federating units. With the support of the former President-General of Ohanaeze Ndigbo, Chief Nnia Nwodo, and the former spokesman for Afenifere, late Mr. Yinka Odumakin, Atiku, conceived that there is need to restructure the present Nigeria federalism. Atiku (cited in Nyekwere & Duson, 2020, p.15) explained that, 'restructuring implies making changes to our present federal arrangement, in other to come closer to what our founding leaders instituted, in reaction to the very problems and challenges that led them to choose a less centralized system'.

It entails handing up more authority and resources to the federating units. It means that the federating groups will have more control over the resources in their own regions and a reduction in the federal government's powers and functions, allowing it to concentrate on matters best handled by the center, such as defense, foreign policy, fiscal and monetary policies, customs and excise, aviation, and immigration, as well as setting and enforcing national standards in areas like education, health, and safety. However, all the present protests be it resource control, MASSOB, IPOB, OPC, Arewa youths, etc., are all calls for Nigeria to return to what was in existence before it was abrogated in 1966 that is devolution of more powers from the federal government and de-emphasizing federal allocations as a basis of sustenance of states (Agan and Yusuf, 2020). An excessively powerful center does

not guarantee national unity and integration. This situation needs to change to avoid this incessant clamor for restructuring and or secession.

(c)Sectional Domination of Powers; one of the political economy of Nigeria federalism is sectional domination of powers and political leadership. Originally, the goal for the split and subsequent merging of various ethnic groups and political institutions was not to promote the national interest, but to nepotize sectional interests, as evidenced by accessible evidence. This is well-explained in the remarks given by Falola and Heaton (2008, p.117), thus:

The ostensible reason for amalgamating the Nigerian Protectorates was economic...the economy of the Northern Protectorate had floundered under indirect rule and had not become fully self-financing as of 1914. Taxation had not produced enough revenue to cover the administrative needs of the Protectorate, and commerce had not grown sufficiently to make the region profitable to finance itself, the Northern Protectorate relied on annual subsidies from Southern Nigeria and an imperial grant-in-aid from the British government to the tune of approximately £300,000.

However, following the over sixty (60) years since Nigeria's political independence, the North has controlled the country for more than 40 years, while the South has reigned for less than 20 years as shown in table one below;

Table 1. Heads of state in Nigeria

Name	Region	Year
Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa	North	Oct 1960-Jan 1966
Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe	South	Oct 1960-Jan 1966
Major General Aguiyi-Ironsi	South	Jan 1966-July 1966
Gen. Yakubu Gowon	North	July 1966-July 1975
Brigadier Murtala Mohammed	North	July 1975- Feb 1976
Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo	South	Feb 1976- Oct 1979
Alhaji Shehu Shagari	North	Oct 1979-Dec 1983
Gen. Muhammadu Buhari	North	Dec 1983- Aug 1985
Gen. Ibrahim Babangida	North	Aug 1985-Aug 1993
Chief Ernest Shonekan	South	Aug 1993-Nov 1993
Gen. Sani Abacha	North	Nov 1993-June 1998
Gen Abdulsalami Abubakar	North	June 1998-May 1999
Chief Olusegun Obasanjo	South	May 1999-May 2007
Alhaji Umaru Musa Yar'Adua	North	May 2007-May 2010
Dr. Goodluck Ebele Jonathan	South	May 2010-May 2015
President Muhammadu Buhari	North	May 2015 till date

Source: Authors, (2021)

In addition, the North has 19 states, whilst the South has 17. In the distribution of head of ministries, security chiefs and so on, the North carry majority. Today, the heads of the executive, legislature and judiciary, the military as well as most of the para military are from the north. See Table 2 below.

Table 2. Key heads of Government institution in Nigeria under President Muhammadu Buhari

Name	Agency/Dept	Region
President Muhammadu Buhari	President of Nigeria	North
Senator Ahmed Lawan	Senate President	North
Hon. Justice Tanko Mohammed	Chief Justice of Nigeria	North
Gen. Farouk Yahaya	Chief of Army Staff	North
Usman Alkali Baba	Inspector General of Police	North
Gen BabaganaMonguno	National Security Adviser	North
Ahmed Abubakar Audi	CG NSCDC	North
Yusuf MagajiBichi	DG SSS	North
Muhammed Babandede	CG Nig. Immigration Serv.	North
Hameed Ibrahim Ali	DG Nigeria custom service	North

Source: Authors, (2021)

The implication of these is that other ethnic groups and regions have been made subservient to the Northern region since inception till date. Its consequent effect is the emergence of series of ethnic militants armed with the purpose of standing against the injustice for being short-changed in the distribution and allocation of powers and resources. With these disturbing trends, Nigeria may stand the risk of democratic recession, another civil war and probably division. It is imperative therefore for all stakeholders to concentrate more on how to manage the present Nigeria's federal structures towards ensuring national unity and integration, stability and development, rather than promoting superfluous divisions and disintegration.

(d)The federal government's insincerity; One other political economy of Nigeria federalism as analyzed here, is the insincerity and dishonesty of the federal government to develop the Nigerian state. The collapse in the Nigerian governance system has been a significant factor in hindering development in Nigeria. The quantum of debt profile and the laxity in accountability in the governmental order in Nigeria has done much damage to growth, particularly in the Niger Delta region, North Eastern region and Nigeria in general. In 2000 for instance, the Federal Government of Nigeria set up the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) with a mandate to conceive, plan and implement projects and programs for the sustainable development of the Niger Delta area and to undertake infrastructural development in the region. The NDDC began operation in 2001. Although NDDC has implemented some projects, but the prime purpose remains an illusion. Equally, the North East Development Commission (NEDC) was established in 2017, after the Bill establishing the Commission was passed by the two legislative chambers, on October 25th, 2017 President Muhammadu Buhari assented to the Bill, then signing it into an Act.

The NEDC is charged with the responsibility to, “among other things, receive and manage funds allocated to it from the Federal Account and international donors for the settlement, rehabilitation and reconstruction of roads, houses and business premises of victims of insurgency as well as tackling the menace of poverty, illiteracy level, ecological problems and any other related environmental or developmental challenges in the North-East states” of Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba, Yobe. This too have been a mirage as there is a gross problem of accountability, corruption and dishonesty.

The manner at which the Nigeria government is handling the issues of banditry, kidnapping, insurgency and general insecurity as well as NnamdiKanu’s IPOB and Sunday Igboho’s Oduduwa secessionist movements, is deceptive and insincere. Hence, the political economy of Nigeria federalism is predicated on deception, dishonesty and insincerity of the leaders.

Conclusion and Recommendations

From a political-economy perspective, this paper asserts that the contestation over federalism in Nigeria has manifested itself not only in the quest for access and control over political power but also in access to federally generated revenue where the people are clamoring for restructuring and a considerable upward review in the current 13 per cent derivation. Therefore, Nigeria is not a healthy federalism as it has long been plagued by “infection” from the ‘viruses’ of anti-federalism such as; resource control and sharing formula crisis, over-concentration of powers at the center, sectional domination of powers and the federal government's insincerity especially in the areas of resource management, appointments and insecurity. As a result, if Nigerian federalism is to endure today's strains and stressors, it must be cared for carefully and delicately with the following.

First, states should pay the central government an agreed-upon amount of tax or royalty, and states (component units) should be allowed to participate in the discovery and extraction of resources naturally endowed in their respective domains. In other word, the Nigerian Federal Government should address the issue of economic resource over centralization, which is at the heart of Nigeria's fiscal federalism failure. Secondly, all remnants of the unitary system of government should be eradicated, and the states should be given the degree of freedom and autonomy that is consistent with federalism. Also, the law that vests all mineral resources under the soil of Nigeria in the federal government should be abolished. And finally, government especially at federal level must be sincere, honest, transparent and accountable to her citizens.

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